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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
which has arisen under the section and rule lOb-5 suggests that the purchase
or sale requirement should not be disregarded. The Penn Central de-
cision, while not presenting the most convincing rationale, is consistent
with these policies. While the notion of purchase or sale has been expanded
to include corporate mergers, the limits of this expanded notion do not ex-




OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE
HUMANITARIAN NEGLIGENCE INSTRUCTION AND
THE APPARENT DANGER INSTRUCTION
IN MISSOURI
Curran v. Bi-State Development Agency'
Plaintiff was injured when he was struck by a bus owned and operated
by defendant. Testimony indicated that the bus started from a stopped
position and struck plaintiff who was standing either about four feet in
front of the bus or near the front door on the right side of the bus.
Plaintiff sued for damages, alleging both primary and humanitarian negli-
gence. Verdict and judgment were rendered in favor of plaintiff, from
which defendant appealed. The St. Louis District of the Missouri Court
of Appeals reversed, holding that the evidence did not support the humani-
tarian submission in plaintiff's verdict-directing instruction. The court held
that the plaintiff's position of immediate danger was not so certain, im-
mediate, and impending for a sufficient length of time for the humani-
tarian doctrine to be applied. 2 Also, where the immediate danger arises
only because of something defendant is about to do, and immediate in-
jury results from defendant's act, the case should be submitted on a theory
of primary negligence, not humanitarian negligence.3
This case illustrates a problem which has often confronted attorneys
handling automobile accident cases in Missouri: how to determine when
there is sufficient evidence to submit the humanitarian negligence instruc-
tion, Missouri Approved Jury Instruction (MAI) 17.14,4 and when there
1. 522 S.W.2d 98 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975).
2. Id. at 99.
3. Id. at 100.
4. Mo. APrRovE.D INsTE. § 17.14 (1969):
Your verdict must be for plaintiff [whether or not plaintiff was negli-
gentJ if you believe:
First, plaintiff was in a position of immediate danger of being in-jured and was injured, and
Second, defendant knew or by using the highest degree of care could
have known of such position of immediate danger, and
Third, at the moment when defendant first knew or could have known
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RECENT CASES
is sufficient evidence to submit the primary negligence- instruction for
failure to act after danger of a collision becomes apparent, MAI 17.04.0
The function of a verdict-directing instruction is to relate to the jury the
existing law as it pertains to the facts of the instant case. Thus there must
be substantial evidence to support any verdict-directing instruction which
is submitted to the jury.6 If both negligence theories are submitted, each
must be supported by the evidence. 7 If either submitted theory is not sup-
ported by the evidence, the submission of both is reversible error.8 It is
clearly to the plaintiff's advantage to submit his case on the humanitarian
theory if the evidence supports such a submission because contributory
negligence is not a defense to humanitarian negligence.9
The major difference between the two instructions is the distinction
between the requirement of a condition of "immediate danger" (humani-
tarian negligence) and the requirement of a condition of a "reasonable
likelihood of a collision" (primary negligence). Courts have interpreted
"immediate danger" to mean a situation in which plaintiff and defendant
are on a collision course and in which the collision is practically certain to
occur if the circumstances remain unchanged. The term "collision course"
includes the situation where both plaintiff and defendant are moving
toward a point of collision and the situation where plaintiff is stationary
and defendant is moving directly toward him. "Reasonable likelihood of
collision" does not require the existence of a collision course. It only re-
of such position of immediate danger, defendant still had enough time
so that by using the means available to him and with reasonable safety
to himself and all others and by using the highest degree of care he could
have avoided injury to the plaintiff by slackening, his speed and swerving,
and
Fourth, defendant negligently failed to so slacken *his speed and
swerve, and
Fifth, plaintiff's injury directly resulted therefrom.
(Footnotes omitted). Evasive actions other than slackening and swerving may be
hypothesized. MAI 17.15, the disjunctive humanitarian' instruction, is substan-
tially the same.
5. Mo. APPROVED INSTR. § 17.04 (1969), as typically used in conjunction with
§ 17.01:
Your verdict must be for plaintiff if you believe:
First, defendant knew or by the use of the highest degree of care
could have known that there was a reasonable likelihood of collision in
time thereafter to have slackened his speed but defendant failed to do so,
and
Second, defendant was thereby negligent, and
Third, as a direct result of such negligence the plaintiff sustained
damage.
6. Stotler v. Bollinger, 501 S.W.2d 558, 560 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1973).
7. Johnson v. Bush, 418 S.W.2d 601, 606 (Spr. Mo. App. 1967).
8. Id.
9. Carrell v. Wilkerson, 507 S.W.2d. 82, 86 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974). For
a general discussion of Missouri's humanitarian negligence doctrine, see Gaines,
The Humanitarian Doctrine in Missouri, 20 ST. Louis L. Rrv. 113 (1935). See also
Rich, The Humanitarian Doctrine Re-Examined, 26 J. Mo. B. 38 (1970); Note,
The Humanitarian Rule-A Position of Peril Doctrine, 26 WASH. U.L.Q. 512
(1941); Committee's Comment, Mo. APaovED INsmR. §. 17.14 (1969).
19761 .
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quires that a collision he likely to occur-i.e., a collision course is- likely to
develop.
The facts required for the operation of the humanitarian rule were
authoritatively set forth in Banks v. Morris & Company:'0
(1) Plaintiff was in a position of peril ["immediate danger" under
the present formulation]; (2) defendant had notice thereof (if it
was the duty of defendant to have been on the lookout, construc-
tive notice suffices); (3) defendant after receiving such notice had
the present ability, with the means at hand, to have averted the
impending injury without injury to himself or others; (4) he failed
to exercise ordinary care to avert such impending injury; and (5)
by reason thereof plaintiff was injured."1
The primary negligence submission herein discussed, MAI 17.04, includes
requirements very similar to, if not exact equivalents of, the last four
humanitarian factors.' 2 Both submissions require that defendant knew
or should have known of. the danger, that he had the ability to avoid the
collision, that he was negligent in failing to take evasive action, and that
his negligence caused plaintiff's injury. But the initial and basic require-
ments for the -two submissions are distinguishable.
•.. The humanitarian negligence instruction contains a prerequisite that
plaintiff be in a position of "immediate danger,"'13 whereas the primary
negligence instruction is premised on the existence of a "reasonable likeli-
hood of collision."'1 To meet the humanitarian requirement of immediate
danger, a bare possibility of injury is not sufficient. Plaintiff's peril must
be "certain, immediate, and impending; it may not be remote, uncertain
or contingent."' 5 Immediate danger has been defined as that position of
danger in which; if the existing circumstances remain unchanged;injury is
reasonably certain and,.not contingent on some other occurrence. 10 The
10. 302 Mo. 254, 257 S.W. 482 (1924).
11. Id. at 267, 257 &:W.'at" 484.-
12. See Bolhofner'v: Jones, 482 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972),
where the court said:
This submission has elemed akin to a humanitarian negligence case in
that a defendant's duty arises at the moment he has actual or constructive
notice of the likelihood of a collision, and his negligence is measured by
his ability thereaftei ,to avoid the collision.
13. Mo. A2piovra Iws'&..§§ 17.14, 17.15 (1969). The committee comments
discuss the language used:
The words "immediate danger" have been substituted for the traditional
words "imminent peril." In -the past lawyers have used the words "im-
minent peril" and then given a definition instruction telling the )ury
that "imminent peril" means "certain and immediate danger." If 'im-
minent peril" meais "inimediate danger" it seems far simpler to use the
correct term in the first place and avoid the need for a further definition.
14. Mo. A.PRov, INSTL § 17.04 (1969).
15. McClanahan v. St. Lbuis: Public Service Co., 363 Mo. 500, 505, 251 S.W.2d
704f, 707 (En Banc'1952). See also Clifton v. Crider, 486 S.W.2d 274 (Mo. En Banc
1972); Leap v. Gangelh6ff, 416 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. 1967).
. 16.,, Clifton v., Crider, 486 S.W.2d, 274, 277 (Mo. En Banc 1972)., See also
B iunmet v. Parker, 509 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. 1974); Elam v. Allbee, 432 S.W.2d 379
(St. L. Mo. App. 1968); "Rich, The Humanitarian Doctrine Re-Examined, 26
[Vol. 41
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court in Curran stated that there must be some "inexorable circumstance,
situation or agency bearing down on the plaintiff."' 7
Courts distinguish between physical peril, where plaintiff is physically
unable to remove himself from danger, and mental peril, where plaintiff is
physically capable of escaping the danger, but will not do so because he is
oblivious to the danger.'s The latter is a wider zone of danger.19 When a
case involves physical peril only, a plaintiff moving toward the path of a
moving vehicle is not in a position of immediate danger until he is directly
in the path of the vehicle, or so close thereto that, given his speed and all
other existing conditions, he cannot stop short of its path.20 However, if
plaintiff is oblivious, the zone of danger is expanded. If plaintiff is moving
toward the path of a moving vehicle on a course which will produce a col-
lision if he does not stop, and he is oblivious to the approach of the ve-
hicle, he is at that early point in a position of immediate danger.2 1 Of
course, where the zone of immediate danger is widened by plaintiff's ob-
liviousness, the humanitarian rule still imposes no duty upon defendant
until the fact of plaintiff's obliviousness is discoverable.22 In both physical
peril and mental peril cases, it is dear that there is no position of im-
mediate danger until plaintiff and defendant are on a collision course.23
J. Mo. B. (1970); Note, The Humanitarian Rule-A Position of Peril Doctrine, 26
WAsn. U.L.Q. 512 (1941).
17. 522 S.W.2d at 100. See also Russell v. St. Louis County Cab Co.. 493
S.W.2d 26 (Mo. App., D, St. L. 1973).
18.. See State ex rel. Thompson v. Shain, 349 Mo. 27, 159 S.W.2d 582 (En
Banc 1941).
19. See Findley v. Asher, 334 S.W.2d 70 (Mo. 1960).
20. Smithers v. Barker, 341 Mo. 1017, 1028, 111 S.W.2d 47, 53 (1937). See
also Carrel v. Wilkerson, 507 S.W.2d 82 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974); State ex rel.
Thompson v. Shain, 349 Mo. 27, 159 S.W.2d 582 (En Banc 1941).
21.,Findley v. Asher, 334 S.W.2d 70 (Mo. 1960); State ex rel. Thompson .y.
Shain, 349 Mo. 27, 35, 159 S.W.2d 582, 586 (En Banc 1941). When the facts of
a case reveal that the issue of obliviousness could reasonably be raised, the plaiii-
tiff is presented with another problem. If he wishes to submit: the humanitarian
instruction, he will present evidence showing obliviousness in order to widen the
zone of danger. But if he wishes to submit the primary instruction, he will want
to keep out all evidence of obliviousness in order to avoid 'a finding of con-
tributory negligence.
22. State ex rel. Thompson v. Shain, 349 Mo. 27, 35, 159 S.W.2d 582, 586
(En Banc 1941); Ewen v. Spence, 405 S.W.2d 521, 523-24 (Spr. Mo. App. 1966).
At times the courts have stated that the position of immediate danger itself does
not arise until plaintiff's obliviousness is discoverable. See, e.g., Findley v. Asher,
334 S.W.2d 70, 73 (Mo. 1960). In either case, the humanitarian rule imposes no
duty upon defendant until plaintiff's obliviousness is discoverable. It seems more
logical to treat the position of immediate danger as arising at the point at which
plaintiff's obliviousness will prevent him from avoiding a collision and let the
discoverability of plaintiff's obliviousness go to the requirement of notice, as the
court did in Thompson. Otherwise, there exists the anomaly that plaintiff is in
a position of immediate danger if defendant is able to discqver his obliviousness
(in which case defendant is likely to take action to avoid a collision), but plain-
tiff is not in a position of immediate danger if defendant cannot discover his
obliviousness (in which case defendant is less likely to take evasiye action).
23. Cf. State ex rel. Thompson v. Shain, 349 Mo. 27, 159 S.W.2d 582 (En
Banc 1941); Yarrington v. Lininger, 327 S.W.2d 104 (Mo. 1959).
1976]
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In Burns v. Maxwell24 the Missouri Supreme Court upheld the submis-
sion of the humanitarian instruction. In that case a collision occurred at an
intersection after plaintiff pulled out in front of defendant's approaching
vehicle, defendant having had a clear view of the intersection. The court
noted that the jury could find that sometime after plaintiff began to move
across the intersection at a slow speed, she came into a position of im-
mediate danger by reason of her fixed purpose of entering the path of
defendant's travel. The position of immediate danger existed before plain-
tiff actually.entered the path of defendant's oncoming vehicle, but not be-
fore the vehicles were on a collision course.
In Yarrington v. Lininger25 the supreme court found the submission
of the same instruction reversible error. A collision occurred when a third
party, attempting to pass plaintiff's vehicle, struck defendant's oncoming
vehicle and -deflected into the side of plaintiff's vehicle. The court held
that plaintiff was not in a position of immediate danger until the passing
vehicle started its sideways movement toward plaintiff's vehicle.;0 Not
until that moment was plaintiff on a collision course with the passing
vehicle, and then it was too late for defendant to take evasive action.
The "reasonable likelihood of collision" concept stated in the primary
negligence instruction is one which the courts have been less willing to
define. The concept defines a condition which is much less certain to result
in a collision than is a condition of immediate danger. A reasonable likeli-
hood of collisiori" exists when by the exercise of due care defendant would
realize that a collision is likely to occur unless he takes evasive action.
MAI 17.04 was drafted in conformity with a rule of law27 which was
first stated in Stakelback v). Neff. 28 The court there stated that, the driver
of a motor vehicle has no duty, upon approaching an intersecting street,
to stop, decrease his-speed, or swerve merely because he sees another vehicle
in the street ahead of him. Such'duty to take evasive action arises only
when the exercise of due 6re. would lead him to believe that otherwise
a collision would occur.2 9 More recently the Kansas City Court of Appeals
stated that a motorist need not take evasive action merely because he sees
another car approaching. on his side of the road. The duty to take such
action arises when the motorist should know that the driver of the ap-
proaching car is unable to or will not return to his side of the road.30
The Missouri Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instructions cited a
casey' tried before the approved .instructions were promulgated, in,,which
24. 418 S.W.2d 138 (Mo. 1967).
25, 827 S.W.2d 104 (Mo. 1959).
26. Id. at 110-11.
27. Hawkeye-Security Insurance Co. v. Thomas Grain Fumigint Co., 407
S.W.2d 622,i627 (K.C. Mo App. 1966).
28. 18 S.W.2d 575 (St: L. Mo. App. 1929).
29. Id. at 577. See also Miller v. Greis, 396 S.W.2d 642, 646 (Mao.'1965);
Hawkeye-Security Insurance Co. v. Thomas Grain Fumigant Co., 407 S.W.2d 622,
627 (K.C. Mo. App. 1966).
30. Allan v. Read, 433 S.W.2d 58; 61-62 (K.C. Mo. App. 1968).
81. Mo. APPaovED INsM. § 17.04 Committee's Comments (1969).
[Vol. 41
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the Missouri Supreme Court approved the use of instructions similar to
MAI 17.04. In that case a horse was killed and its rider injured when the
horse backed into the side of defendant's passing truck.3 2 The court noted
that the actions of the horse gave defendant notice of plaintiff's inability
to control the horse twelve seconds before the collision. During that time,
there existed a reasonable likelihood of collision, even though the truck
and the horse were not on a collision course.
In Offenbacker v. Sodowsky33 a collision between two cars occurred
ahead of defendant's truck. Defendant, trying to go around the collision,
struck one of the cars, the driver of which was killed. The court upheld
the submission of MAI 17.04, hypothesizing a failure to stop. Disregarding
defendant's contention that the evidence must show that defendant's truck
and plaintiff's car were on a collision course, the court found the evidence
sufficient for a jury to reasonably conclude that when the two cars collided
there existed a reasonable likelihood of a collision involving defendant's
truck. The court said that defendant should have known that colliding au-
tomobiles frequently do not remain in the traffic lane where the collision
occurs. The court pointed out that in order for a reasonable likelihood of
a collision to exist, it is not necessary that a person anticipate an occurrence
exactly as it happened. 34
The following hypothetical illustrates the difference in applicability
of the two instructions. A small child is walking along the shoulder of a
highway bouncing a ball 200 feet ahead of defendant's automobile which is
traveling at 50 miles per hour. The ball eludes the child and bounces onto
the highway. The child makes no immediate attempt to retrieve it. De-
fendant continues at a constant rate of speed. When defendant is 25 feet
from the child, the child scampers into defendant's path to retrieve the
ball. Defendant at this point is unable to stop or swerve and strikes the
child. The humanitarian instruction does not apply because there was no
collision course, and therefore no immediate danger, until the child be-
gan to move toward defendant's path. At that time it was too late to take
evasive action. However, the dangerous situation existed and could be
seen by defendant from 200 feet away when the ball bounced onto the
highway. At that point defendant could have slackened his speed or taken
other precautionary action. Therefore, the apparent danger instruction is
applicable to this situation.35
32. Chailland v. Smiley, 363 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. En Banc 1963).
33. 499 S.W.2d 421 (Mo. 1973).
34. Id. at 423-24; Creager v. Chilson, 453 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Mo. 1970). -
35. As a practical matter, when the plaintiff is a child, instruction 17.04 may
be as advantageous to the plaintiff as is the humanitarian instruction. This is be-
cause, although the fact that the plaintiff is a child does not preclude the defense
of contributory negligence, the standard for judging a child's conduct is the care
and prudence "ordinarily exercised by one of the age, intelligence, discretion,
knowledge and experience of the particular plaintiff, under the same or similar
circumstances." Bollman v. Kark Rendering Plant, 418 S.W.2d 39, 46 (Mo. 1967).
Human nature being what it is, a jury is not likely to find that a child was
contributorily negligent, except in an extraordinary case.
1976]
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The apparent danger instruction and the humanitarian instruction
are identical in several respects. Both require that defendant have actual
or constructive notice of the danger; that defendant, after receiving such
notice, have the present ability to avoid injury to the plaintiff; that de-
fendant be negligent in failing to avoid such injury; and that there be a
proximate causal connection between that negligence and plaintiff's in-
jury.36
The major distinction between the two instructions goes to the very
basis of each doctrine. For the humanitarian instruction to be submissible,
the prerequisite of a condition of immediate danger is met only if the
evidence shows that defendant and plaintiff were on a collision course.
The apparent danger instruction's basic requirement of a reasonable like-
lihood of collision does not necessitate a showing that defendant and plain-
tiff were on a collision course. Only a showing that a collision was reason-
ably likely is required.
Of course, in all cases a collision course will eventually have de-
veloped because a collision will have occurred. But the crucial time for
determining the necessity vel non of showing a collision course is the
time at which defendant had the ability to take effective evasive action.
For a submission of the humanitarian instruction, such a showing is re-
quired, whereas it is not required for a submission of the apparent danger
instruction.
Proof of the existence of a danger of a collision should require less
specific and detailed evidence than does proof of the existence of a col-
lision course. So, although the evidentiary requirement is the same for pur-
poses of showing that defendant had the present ability to take effective
evasive action after the dangerous condition was actually or constructively
known by him,3 7 the evidentiary requirement for purposes of showing
that the dangerous situation existed in the first instance should be more
lenient under the apparent danger instruction than under the humani-
tarian instruction.
The humanitarian instruction can be very helpful to a plaintiff who
may have been contributorily negligent. However, as Curran and a signi-
ficant number of other cases make clear, Missouri appellate courts readily
reverse judgments based on that instruction when there was insufficient
evidence to support its submission.
DAVID F. STOVERINK
36. MAI 17.04 is actually very similar to the general lookout instruction,
MAI 17.05. These two instructions have been interpreted to entail the same re-
quirements. MAI 17.05, like 17.04, requires evidence showing that there was time
to take effective evasive action. See Young v. Grotsky, 459 S.W.2d 206 (Mo. 1970);
Corbin v. Wennerberg, 459 S.W.2d 505 (K.C. Mo. App. 1970). MAI 17.05 applies
even though defendant saw the dangerous situation, if he failed to take action
to prevent the injury to plaintiff. See Young v. Grotsky, 459 S.W.2d 306 (Mo. 1970);
Jackson v. Skelly Oil Co., 413 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. En Banc 1967).
37. , Both MAI 17.04 and 17.14 normally require specific evidence of speed,
stoppinig distances, visibility, and other factors to show that defendant had the
ability to take effective action. See, e.g., Cook v. Cox, 478 S.W.2d 678 (Mo. 1972).
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